reasoning
Mar 04, 2026REASON-008Three bidders (A, B, C) are in a first-price sealed-bid auction for an item. Their private valuations are: - A values it at $100 - B values it at $80 - C values it at $60 Each bidder knows only their own valuation but knows the valuations are uniformly distributed between $0 and $100 for all bidders. 1. What is each bidder's optimal strategy? 2. What is the expected revenue for the seller? 3. How would this change in a second-price auction? 4. If the bidders could collude, what would happen?
Winner
GPT-OSS-120B
OpenAI
9.52
WINNER SCORE
matrix avg: 8.32
10×10 Judgment Matrix · 100 judgments
OPEN DATA
| Judge ↓ / Respondent → | Claude Opus 4.5 | Gemini 3 | MiMo-V2-Flash | Claude Sonnet 4.5 | DeepSeek V3.2 | Gemini 3 | Gemini 2.5 Flash | GPT-OSS-120B | OLMo Think | Grok 3 (Direct) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Opus 4.5 | — | 9.2 | 9.4 | 8.4 | 8.8 | 0.0 | 8.2 | 9.2 | 0.0 | 8.4 |
| Gemini 3 | 9.8 | — | 10.0 | 10.0 | 9.8 | 0.0 | 9.8 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 9.8 |
| MiMo-V2-Flash | 9.0 | 8.6 | — | 9.0 | 8.3 | 7.6 | 8.2 | 9.0 | 6.6 | 8.2 |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 | 9.2 | 9.4 | 9.4 | — | 8.4 | 0.7 | 9.2 | 9.8 | 0.7 | 9.0 |
| DeepSeek V3.2 | 9.0 | 9.7 | 9.4 | 9.4 | — | 6.6 | 9.0 | 9.2 | 8.6 | 9.2 |
| Gemini 3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | — | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Gemini 2.5 Flash | 9.0 | 9.4 | 9.7 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 0.0 | — | 10.0 | 0.0 | 9.2 |
| GPT-OSS-120B | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | — | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| OLMo Think | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | — | 0.0 |
| Grok 3 (Direct) | 9.0 | 8.7 | 9.2 | 8.7 | 8.4 | 0.0 | 8.4 | 9.4 | 0.0 | — |