reasoning
Mar 04, 2026REASON-008Three bidders (A, B, C) are in a first-price sealed-bid auction for an item. Their private valuations are: - A values it at $100 - B values it at $80 - C values it at $60 Each bidder knows only their own valuation but knows the valuations are uniformly distributed between $0 and $100 for all bidders. 1. What is each bidder's optimal strategy? 2. What is the expected revenue for the seller? 3. How would this change in a second-price auction? 4. If the bidders could collude, what would happen?
Winner
Claude Opus 4.6
openrouter
9.36
WINNER SCORE
matrix avg: 8.43
10×10 Judgment Matrix · 80 judgments
OPEN DATA
| Judge ↓ / Respondent → | DeepSeek V4 | Gemini 3.1 Pro | Claude Opus 4.6 | GPT-5.4 | Grok 4.20 | Claude Sonnet 4.6 | MiMo-V2-Flash | GPT-OSS-120B | Gemini 2.5 Flash | MiniMax M2.5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DeepSeek V4 | — | 8.4 | 9.4 | 9.4 | 8.4 | 9.4 | 9.4 | 8.4 | 8.7 | · |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro | 10.0 | — | 10.0 | 8.3 | 9.6 | 10.0 | 6.8 | 9.1 | 8.5 | · |
| Claude Opus 4.6 | 8.8 | 5.7 | — | 8.3 | 9.0 | 8.0 | · | 8.0 | 7.8 | · |
| GPT-5.4 | 8.0 | 5.0 | 9.2 | — | 8.8 | 8.0 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 8.0 | · |
| Grok 4.20 | 8.4 | 7.0 | 8.7 | 8.7 | — | 7.0 | 6.6 | 8.4 | 7.6 | · |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 | 8.6 | 6.5 | 9.4 | 8.0 | 8.8 | — | 7.3 | 8.8 | 8.6 | · |
| MiMo-V2-Flash | 9.0 | 8.4 | 9.2 | 8.6 | 9.0 | 9.4 | — | 8.6 | 8.8 | · |
| GPT-OSS-120B | 8.3 | 6.2 | 8.7 | 8.4 | 9.1 | 8.4 | 7.6 | — | 8.3 | · |
| Gemini 2.5 Flash | 10.0 | 7.3 | 10.0 | 9.7 | 9.4 | 10.0 | 8.8 | 9.4 | — | · |
| MiniMax M2.5 | 8.8 | 6.5 | 9.7 | 9.2 | 8.8 | 9.2 | 8.8 | 7.5 | 9.0 | — |